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A Computationally Efficient Implementation of
Fictitious Play for Large-Scale Games
BRIAN SWENSON†⋆, SOUMMYA KAR† AND JO ˜AO XAVIER⋆
Abstract
The paper is concerned with distributed learning and optimization in large-scale settings. The well-
known Fictitious Play (FP) algorithm has been shown to achieve Nash equilibrium learning in certain
classes of multi-agent games. However, FP can be computationally difficult to implement when the
number of players is large. Sampled FP is a variant of FP that mitigates the computational difficulties
arising in FP by using a Monte-Carlo (i.e., sampling-based) approach. The Sampled FP algorithm has
been studied both as a tool for distributed learning and as an optimization heuristic for large-scale
problems. Despite its computational advantages, a shortcoming of Sampled FP is that the number of
samples that must be drawn in each round of the algorithm grows without bound (on the order of
√
t, where t is the round of the repeated play). In this paper we propose Computationally Efficient
Sampled FP (CESFP)—a variant of Sampled FP in which only one sample need be drawn each round
of the algorithm (a substantial reduction from O(√t) samples per round, as required in Sampled FP).
CESFP operates using a stochastic-approximation type rule to estimate the expected utility from round
to round. It is proven that the CESFP algorithm achieves Nash equilibrium learning in the same sense as
classical FP and Sampled FP. Simulation results suggest that the convergence rate of CESFP (in terms
of repeated-play iterations) is similar to that of Sampled FP.
I. INTRODUCTION
A game-theoretic learning algorithm is an adaptive multi-agent procedure which can enable
a system of interacting agents to achieve desirable global behavior using local (agent-based)
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2control laws. Such algorithms have a wide range of applications in distributed control [1]–[5]
and large-scale optimization [6]–[10].
Fictitious Play (FP) [11] is an archetypal game-theoretic learning algorithm that has received
much attention over the years due to its intuitively simple nature and proven convergence results
for certain important classes of games (see, for example, [12], [13] and references therein). Of
particular interest are results demonstrating that FP leads players1 to learn equilibrium strategies
in potential games—a class of multi-agent games in which there may be an arbitrarily large
number of players [14], [15].
However, such convergence results tend to be of limited practical value due to computational
difficulties that may arise when implementing FP in large games. In particular, in each stage of
the FP algorithm, each player i must compute the expected (mixed) utility for each of her actions
given her current beliefs regarding opponents’ strategies. Evaluating this expected utility—the
domain of which is an (n−1)-dimensional probability simplex—is a problem whose complexity
in general scales exponentially in terms of the number of players, n.
The main focus of the present paper is the presentation of a variant of FP that might be
more practical to implement in certain large-scale settings. In particular, we consider a practical
method for mitigating computational complexity using a Monte-Carlo type approach.
Sampled FP [9], [10], [16]–[19] introduced the idea of mitigating complexity in FP using a
Monte-Carlo (i.e., sampling-based) approach. At each iteration of the Sampled FP algorithm,
players approximate the expected utility by drawing several samples from an underlying prob-
ability distribution. Players then myopically choose an “optimal” next-stage action using the
approximated utility as a surrogate for the true expected utility. The work [9] showed that, as
long as the number of samples drawn each round grows sufficiently quickly, players learn an
equilibrium in the same sense as FP, almost surely (a.s.).
In essence, Sampled FP achieves a mitigation in complexity by avoiding any direct evaluation
of the expected utility. However, Sampled FP has a notable shortcoming: In order to guarantee
learning is achieved, the number of samples that must be drawn in each iteration (i.e., round)
of the algorithm grows without bound (on the order of √t samples per round, where t is the
current round of the repeated play algorithm).
1We use the terms agent and player interchangeably throughout the paper.
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3In this paper, we propose a variant of Sampled FP—which we call Computationally Efficient
Sampled FP (CESFP)—in which only one sample need be drawn each round of the repeated
play process. CESFP achieves the same fundamental computational advantage as Sampled FP
(i.e., direct evaluation of the expected utility is avoided) but does so by drawing only one sample
per round (rather than the O(√t) samples per round, required in Sampled FP).
Intuitively, the reduction in the required number of per-round samples is accomplished by
treating the expected utility process as quasi static. Such treatment is possible due to the
diminishing incremental step size in the the expected utility process. In CESFP, the sample data
gathered in the current round of repeated play is recursively combined with sample data from
previous rounds using a stochastic-approximation-type estimation rule. This may be contrasted
with Sampled FP where, in each round of the repeated play, data gathered from sampling in the
previous round is wholly discarded and a fresh set of samples is gathered to approximate the
expected utility for the upcoming round. (See Section V-C for more details.)
Due to the improved efficiency in information handling, CESFP is able to achieve convergence
at a rate similar to that of sampled FP (in terms of repeated-play iterations) despite drawing far
fewer samples per-iteration. (See Section VI for more details.)
The main contribution of the paper is the presentation of the CESFP algorithm and proof of
convergence of the algorithm in terms of empirical frequency to the set of Nash equilibria (a.s.).
The proof relies on showing that the CESFP process may be seen as a Generalized Weakened
FP process as studied in [20].
CESFP may be applicable as a computationally efficient variant of FP in a variety of settings
including large-scale optimization [9], [18], dynamic programming [16], [17], traffic routing
[10], and cognitive radio [4], [21], [22], and learning in Markov decision processes [19]. CESFP
may also be used as a general tool for distributed learning [23] or control [1].
Related works have studied approaches for mitigating computational issues arising in large-
scale implementations of FP. Joint Strategy FP (JSFP) [24] studies a variant of FP in which
players update a utility estimate using a computationally-simple recursive procedure and choose
next-stage actions using a best-response rule combined with an inertial term. JSFP is shown to
converge to pure strategy Nash equilibria (NE) in ordinal potential games but is fundamentally
different from CESFP (and FP) in that the tracked utility corresponds to an empirical distribution
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4taken over joint actions,2 and convergence may only occur at pure NE.
Payoff-based learning algorithms—including those based on FP [20], [25]–[27] and otherwise
[28]–[30]—tend to be computationally simple in large games and have the further advantage that
they do not require players to have any knowledge of the game’s utility structure. However, such
algorithms implicitly assume players have access to instantaneous payoff information and may
not be applicable in settings where this information is costly to obtain, delayed, or otherwise
unavailable.
For example, in a follow-up paper [23] we consider an application in which CESFP is
implemented in a network-based setting in which all inter-agent communication is restricted
to a preassigned (possibly sparse) communication graph [31]. Instantaneous payoff information
can be difficult to obtain in such a setting, particularly in the case that the utility corresponds to
a non-local welfare-type utility function, which may not be physically measurable at any single
agent. Furthermore, there are circumstances in which each round of physical game play can incur
an exogenous cost. In such cases it may be preferable to supplement payoff-based learning—
which depends on interaction in the physical environment—with forms of model-based learning.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II sets up the notation to be used
in the subsequent development. Section III reviews classical FP. Section IV reviews Sampled
FP. Section V presents the CESFP algorithm, states the main convergence result for CESFP, and
proves the result. Section VI presents a simulation example comparing Sampled FP and CESFP.
Section VII provides concluding remarks.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A game in normal form is represented by the tuple Γ := (N, (Yi, ui)i∈N), where N =
{1, . . . , n} denotes the set of players, Yi denotes the finite set of actions available to player
i, and ui :
∏
i∈N Yi → R denotes the utility function of player i. Denote by Y :=
∏
i∈N Yi the
joint action space.
In order to guarantee the existence of Nash equilibria it is necessary to consider the mixed-
extension of Γ in which players are permitted to play probabilistic strategies. Let mi := |Yi| be
2In FP, Sampled FP, and CESFP, players best respond to the product of marginal empirical distributions (or an estimate thereof)
which implicitly presumes a form of independence among opponents’ strategies. Tracking and responding to the empirical
distribution of joint actions, as in JSFP, fundamentally alters the dynamics of classical FP. CESFP achieves computationally
efficiency while preserving the basic dynamical structure of FP.
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5the cardinality of the action space of player i, and let ∆i := {p ∈ Rmi :
∑mi
k=1 p(k) = 1, p(k) ≥
0, ∀k} denote the set of mixed strategies available to player i—note that a mixed strategy is a
probability distribution over the action space of player i. Denote by ∆n :=
∏
i∈N ∆i the set of
joint mixed strategies. When convenient, we represent a mixed strategy p ∈ ∆n by p = (pi, p−i),
where pi denotes the marginal strategy of player i and p−i is a (n − 1)-tuple containing the
marginal strategies of the other players.
In the context of mixed strategies, we often wish to retain the notion of playing a single
deterministic action. For this purpose, let Ai := {e1, . . . , emi} denote the set of “pure strategies”
of player i, where ej is the j-th canonical vector containing a 1 at position j and zeros otherwise.
Note that there is a one-to-one correspondence between a player’s action set Yi and the player’s
set of pure strategies Ai ⊂ ∆i.
The mixed utility function of player i is given by
Ui(p) :=
∑
y∈Y
ui(y)p1(y) . . . pn(y) (1)
where Ui : ∆n → R. Note that the mixed utility Ui(p) may be interpreted as the expected utility
of ui(y) given that players’ (marginal) mixed strategies pi are independent.
The set of Nash equilibria is given by NE := {p ∈ ∆n : Ui(pi, p−i) ≥ Ui(p′i, p−i), ∀p′i ∈
∆i, ∀i ∈ N}. The distance of a distribution p ∈ ∆n from a set S ⊂ ∆n is given by d(p, S) =
inf{‖p − p′‖ : p′ ∈ S}. Throughout the paper ‖ · ‖ denotes the standard L2 Euclidean norm
unless otherwise specified.
Throughout, we assume there exists a probability space (Ω,F ,P) rich enough to carry out
the construction of the various random variables required in the paper. For a random object X
defined on a measurable space (Ω,F), let σ(X) denote the σ-algebra generated by X [32]. As a
matter of convention, all equalities and inequalities involving random objects are to be interpreted
almost surely (a.s.) with respect to the underlying probability measure, unless otherwise stated.
A. Repeated Play
The learning algorithms considered in this paper all assume the following format of repeated
play. Let a normal form game Γ be fixed. Let players repeatedly face off in the game Γ, and for
t ∈ {1, 2, . . .}, let ai(t) ∈ Ai denote the action played by player i in round t. Let the n-tuple
a(t) = (a1(t), . . . , an(t)) denote the joint action at time t.
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6Let the empirical history distribution (or empirical distribution) of player i be given by3
qi(t) :=
1
t
∑t
s=1 ai(s), and let the joint empirical distribution be given by the n-tuple q(t) =
(q1(t), . . . , qn(t)).
III. FICTITIOUS PLAY
A FP process may be intuitively described as follows: A finite set of n agents engage in
repeated play of some fixed normal form game. Each round of the repeated play, each agent i
plays an action that is myopically optimal under the (naive) assumption that all opponents are
playing according to time-invariant and statistically independent strategies. In particular, under
this assumption, each player i believes that the empirical distribution q−i(t) of opponents’ play
is an accurate representation of opponents’ (supposedly time-invariant) strategies and chooses a
next-stage action that optimizes their utility given this belief.
A formal description of the FP algorithm is given below.
A. FP algorithm
Initialize
(i) Each player i chooses an arbitrary initial action ai(1) ∈ Ai. The empirical distribution is
initialized as qi(1) = ai(1), ∀i.
Iterate (t ≥ 1)
(ii) Each player i chooses her next-stage action as a best response to the current empirical
distribution of opponents’ play:
ai(t + 1) ∈ arg max
αi∈Ai
Ui(αi, q−i(t)). (2)
(iii) For each player i, the empirical distribution is updated to reflect the action just taken,
qi(t + 1) =
1
t+1
∑t+1
s=1 ai(s), or equivalently in recursive form:
qi(t + 1) = qi(t) +
1
t + 1
(ai(t+ 1)− qi(t)).
3Note that each ai(t) ∈ Ai is a delta distribution, and thus the empirical distribution qi(t) is a normalized histogram of the
action choices of player i.
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7B. Discussion
Various works have established results characterizing classes of games in which FP does
(or does not) lead players to learn NE strategies (see monographs [12], [13]). Of particular
relevance to the large-scale setting is a class of multi-agent games known as potential games
[15]. A game Γ = (N, (Yi, ui(·))i∈N) is said to be a potential game if there exists a potential
function φ : Y n → R such that for all i ∈ N , and all y−i ∈ Y−i
ui(yi, y−i)− ui(xi, y−i) = φ(yi, y−i)− φ(xi, y−i), ∀yi, xi ∈ Yi.
Intuitively, the existence of a potential function means that all player’s utility functions are
aligned in such way that players share a common underlying objective. It has been shown [14],
[15] that if Γ is a potential game, then FP leads players to learn NE strategies in the sense that
limt→∞ d(q(t), NE) = 0.
C. Computational Complexity in large-scale FP
While FP is theoretically proven to achieve NE learning in potential games, it can be com-
putationally difficult to implement when the number of players is large. In particular, note
that in order to choose a next-stage action (see (2)) player i must compute the mixed utility
Ui(αi, q−i(t)), ∀αi ∈ Ai. Recalling the definition of mixed utility (1), this is equivalent to
computing an expected value over an (n − 1)-dimensional probability simplex. In general, the
complexity of this computation grows exponentially in terms of the number of players.
IV. SAMPLED FP
In order to mitigate the problem of computational complexity in FP, [9] proposed Sampled
FP. In Sampled FP, players use a Monte-Carlo approach to avoid direct evaluation of the mixed
utility when choosing a next-stage action.
In particular, for each αi ∈ Ai, let Ûi(αi, t) denote an estimate that player i forms of the
mixed utility Ui(αi, q−i(t)). Each round of play, for each player i, several “test actions” are
drawn as random samples from opponents’ joint empirical distribution q−i(t). For each action
αi ∈ Ai, player i computes the average utility the action αi would generate given the randomly
sampled “test actions.” Player i then chooses a next-stage action that is myopically optimal using
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8the estimated utility as a surrogate for the true mixed utility in (2). So long as the number of
samples increases sufficiently quickly, it can be shown that Sampled FP leads players to learn
NE strategies.
Formally, let kt denote the number of samples drawn in round t. The following assumption
on kt is sufficient to ensure learning is achieved.
A. 1. The number of samples drawn in round t satisfies kt = ⌈Ctγ⌉ where γ > 1/2 and C > 0.
The Sampled FP algorithm is outlined below.
A. Sampled FP Algorithm
Initialize
(i) Each player i chooses an arbitrary initial action ai(1) ∈ Ai. The empirical distribution is
initialized as qi(1) = ai(1), ∀i.
Iterate (t ≥ 1)
(ii) kt “test actions” are drawn as random samples from the joint empirical distribution q(t); let
a˜s(t) denote the s-th random sample drawn in round t. Player i estimates the utility of each of
her actions αi ∈ Ai by4
Ûi(αi, t) =
1
kt
kt∑
s=1
Ui(αi, a˜
s
−i(t)). (3)
(iii) Each player i chooses a next-stage action that is a best response given her estimate of the
mixed utility:
ai(t+ 1) ∈ arg max
αi∈Ai
Ûi(αi, t). (4)
(iv) The empirical distribution for each player i is updated recursively to account for the action
just taken:
qi(t+ 1) = q(t) +
1
t + 1
(ai(t + 1)− qi(t)) .
B. Convergence Result
The following result ( [9], Theorem 5) shows that under A.1, Sampled FP achieves NE
learning in the same sense as classical FP for a special class of potential games known as
4Since a˜−i(t) is a pure strategy, the evaluation of the utility is relatively simple. Note also that it is not necessary to draw a
separate sequence of “test actions” {a˜s(t)}kt
s=1
for each player i, although, doing so does not affect the convergence result.
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9identical interests games [14], in which all players use an identical utility function; i.e., ui(y) =
uj(y), ∀y ∈ Y, ∀i, j ∈ N.
Theorem 1 (Theorem 5 in [9]). Let Γ be a finite game in strategic form with identical payoffs.
Then, any Sampled FP process with sample sizes satisfying A.1 converges in beliefs to equilibrium
with probability 1. That is, d(q(t), NE) → 0 almost surely as t→∞.
V. COMPUTATIONALLY EFFICIENT SAMPLED FP
While Sampled FP does obtain computational savings when compared to classical FP, it may
be considered unsatisfactory in the sense that it requires players to draw a number of samples
each round that grows without bound (see A.1). In this section, we present an adaptation of
Sampled FP in which only one sample need be drawn each round of the repeated play.
A. Algorithm Setup
In CESFP, players form an estimate of the mixed utility using a recursive stochastic-approximation-
type rule. Similar to Sampled FP, let Ûi(αi, t) be the estimate which player i maintains of the
mixed utility Ui(αi, q−i(t)) for each of her actions αi ∈ Ai. Let {ρ(t)}t≥1 be a deterministic
sequence of weights to be used in the stochastic-approximation-type procedure, and assume:
A. 2. The sequence {ρ(t)}t≥ is such that 0 < ρ(t) ≤ 1,
∑
t≥1(ρ(t))
2 <∞, and limt→∞ 1tρ(t) = 0.
Note that, by Lemma 3, A.2 implies that
∑
t≥1 ρ(t) = ∞. The Computationally Efficient
Sampled FP algorithm is outlined below.
B. Computationally Efficient Sampled FP Algorithm
Initialize
(i) For each i ∈ N , let ai(1) ∈ Ai be arbitrary. Initialize the empirical distribution as qi(1) =
ai(1), ∀i, and initialize the utility estimate as Û(αi, 0) = 0, ∀αi ∈ Ai, ∀i.
Iterate (t ≥ 1)
(ii) A single “test action” a∗(t) is drawn as a (statistically independent) random sample from
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the distribution q(t), and each player i updates the estimate Ûi(αi, t) for each action αi ∈ Ai
according to the recursion,5
Ûi(αi, t) = (1− ρ(t))Ûi(αi, t− 1) + ρ(t)Ui(αi, a∗−i(t)). (5)
(iii) Each player i chooses a next-stage action using the rule (cf. (2), (4)):
ai(t+ 1) ∈ arg max
αi∈Ai
Ûi(αi, t). (6)
(iv) The empirical distribution for each player i is updated to reflect the action just taken:
qi(t + 1) = qi(t) +
1
t + 1
(ai(t+ 1)− qi(t)). (7)
C. Discussion
The main difference between Sampled FP and CESFP is the manner in which players form
estimates of the mixed utility sequence {U(αi, q−i(t))}t≥1, ∀αi ∈ Ai. In Sampled FP, players’
estimates (see (3)) “start afresh” each round of the repeated play—information gathered from
sampling in the previous round is discarded, and players draw roughly
√
t new samples in order
to form an estimate of the utility for the current round.
This may be considered an inefficient use of information, since the mixed utility only changes
slightly from one round to the next. In particular, note that the mixed utility Ui(αi, ·) is Lipschitz
continuous with some Lipschitz constant K, and the increment of the empirical distribution (7)
is bounded as ‖q(t) − q(t − 1)‖ ≤ M
t
for some constant M > 0. Thus, the increment in the
mixed utility is bounded as
|Ui(αi, q−i(t))− Ui(αi, q−i(t))| ≤ KM/t. (8)
Intuitively speaking, this means that if one has an accurate estimate of the mixed utility
Ui(αi, q−i(t− 1)) in round (t− 1), then it is wasteful to wholly discard this information when
forming an estimate of Ui(αi, q−i(t)). The CESFP estimation rule leverages the diminishing
increment property (8) in order to form an accurate estimate using only one sample per round.
5Since a∗−i(t) is a pure strategy, the evaluation of the utility is relatively simple. Also note that it is not necessary for each
player i to draw a separate “test action” a∗−i(t + 1); although, if desired (for example, in a distributed setting [23]), doing so
does not affect the convergence result.
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Effectively, the Sampled FP estimation rule treats {Ui(αi, q−i(t))}t≥1 as if it were arbitrar-
ily generated from one round to the next—drawing a completely new set of tγ , γ > 1/2
samples to estimate each Ui(αi, q−i(t)). The CESFP estimation rule, on the other hand, treats
{Ui(αi, q−i(t))}t≥1 as if it were quasi static, drawing one sample per round, and taking a type
of average over time.6 Because of this, despite drawing only one sample per round, the CESFP
estimate of Ui(αi, q−i(t)) effectively utilizes information from t samples, while the Sampled FP
estimate utilizes information from (only) tγ , γ > 1/2 samples. In practice, the CESFP and
Sampled FP estimation rules tend to reduce estimation error at comparable rates. See Section
VI for more details.
D. Main Result
The following theorem states that CESFP achieves learning in the same sense as classical FP
(and Sampled FP). The result is stated for a slightly broader classes of games than previously
discussed, including two-player zero-sum games [12], and generic 2×m games [35].
Theorem 2. Let Γ be a potential game, zero-sum game, or generic 2×m game. Let {a(t)}t≥1 be a
Computationally Efficient Sampled FP process, and assume A.2 holds. Then limt→∞ d(q(t), NE) =
0 (a.s.).
Proof: We will prove the result by showing that there exists a sequence {ǫt}t≥1 with
limt→∞ ǫt = 0 such that Ui(ai(t+ 1), q−i(t)) ≥ maxαi∈Ai Ui(αi, q−i(t))− ǫt. By [20], Corollary
5, this is sufficient to guarantee limt→∞ d(q(t), NE) = 0.
Since, by (6), ai(t+ 1) ∈ argmaxαi∈Ai Ûi(αi, t), it is sufficient to show that, for every i ∈ N
and every αi ∈ Ai,
|Ûi(αi, t)− Ui(αi, q−i(t))| → 0 as t→∞ a.s. (9)
(Note that the individual action spaces Ai are finite.) We will show this by invoking the
result of Lemma 2 (see appendix). To that end fix i ∈ N and αi ∈ Ai, and let X(t) :=
6Additional insight may be gained by considering the dynamical systems approach to stochastic approximations (e.g. [33])
which allows one to study the behavior of certain discrete-time processes by analyzing an associated differential equation. In such
an analysis, an estimation rule such as (5) is often considered as a two time-scale system [26], [34], with the ODE associated
with the estimation rule operating at a faster rate than ODE associated with the mixed utility process. In the asymptotic analysis
of such systems, the slower process may often be treated as effectively static compared to the faster process. We note, however,
that the proofs of our results rely primarily on self contained martingale-type arguments, rather than invoking results from
dynamical systems based treatment of stochastic approximation literature.
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Ui(αi, a
∗
−i(t)), t ≥ 1, µ(t) := Ui(αi, q−i(t)), t ≥ 1, and µˆ(t) := Ûi(αi, t), t ≥ 0. For t ≥ 0, let
Ft := σ({q−i(s)}t+1s=1). Note that µ(t) is Ft−1-measurable and that E(X(t)|Ft−1) = µ(t).
In order to invoke Lemma 2 it is sufficient to show that(
1
ρ(t)
− 1
)
(µ(t)− µ(t− 1)) → 0. (10)
Let M := maxq′−i,q′′−i∈∆−i ‖q′−i − q′′−i‖, and note that by (7), ‖q−i(t) − q−i(t − 1)‖ ≤ Mt . The
utility function Ui is multilinear, and hence Lipschitz continuous, so there exists a constant K
such that
|µ(t)− µ(t− 1)| = |Ui(αi, q−i(t))− Ui(αi, q−i(t− 1))|
≤ K‖q−i(t)− q−i(t− 1)‖ ≤ KM/t.
This, together with A.2, implies that (10) holds.
Thus, X(t), µ(t), µˆ(t), and Ft as defined above fit the template of Lemma 2. By Lemma 2,
|Ûi(αi, t)− Ui(αi, q−i(t))| = |µˆ(t)− µ(t)| → 0 as t→∞, verifying that (9) holds.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
In order to demonstrate the computational properties of CESFP and Sampled FP in large
games, we simulated both algorithms in a simple traffic routing scenario. Let N = {1, . . . n}
denote a finite set of drivers (or players). Drivers share a common starting point and a common
destination and may travel on one of 50 parallel routes. Let the set of routes be denoted by R,
and let the action space of player i be given by Yi = R, ∀i. Let σr(y) denote the number of
drivers on route r given the joint strategy y. Each route r ∈ R has an associated cost function
cr : N → R signifying the delay experienced on route r given the number of drivers using the
route. Let the utility function of player i be given by ui(y) := −cyi(σyi(y)). We note that this
game is an instance of a congestion game—a known subset of potential games.
We simulated Sampled FP and CESFP in this routing scenario with 1000 drivers. In the
simulation, Sampled FP used a sample rate of kt = ⌊t.6⌋ samples per round and CESFP used
the parameter ρ(t) = t−.6, ∀t. Figure 1(a) shows the wall clock running time through iteration
t for each algorithm.
Figure 1(b) shows a logarithmic plot of the expected total travel time if the current-iteration
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Fig. 1. (a) Wall clock evaluation time for each algorithm; and (b) Expected total travel time for the mixed strategy q(t).
empirical distribution q(t) were to be used as the joint mixed strategy. While a Nash equilibrium
of the traffic routing game does not necessarily minimize total travel time, the trend shown in
Figure 1(b) is consistent with convergence of q(t) to NE, and suggests a comparable convergence
rate (per repeated-play iteration) for both algorithms.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
The classical Fictitious Play (FP) algorithm can be prohibitively difficult to implement in games
with many players. Sampled FP [9]—a Monte-Carlo based variant of FP—has previously been
proposed as a method of mitigating computational complexity in large-scale implementations of
FP. Though Sampled FP does achieve mitigations in complexity, it suffers from the drawback
that the number of samples that must be gathered in each stage of the algorithm grows without
bound.
The paper proposed Computationally Efficient Sampled FP (CESFP)—a variant of Sampled
FP that requires only one sample to be drawn per stage of the algorithm. CESFP is shown to
achieve Nash equilibrium learning in the same sense as FP. A simulation example was used to
demonstrate the computational properties of CESFP compared to Sampled FP. The simulation
example used a game with fairly simple structural properties. An interesting future research
direction may be to study the relative empirical performance of Sampled FP and CESFP in
games with more complex structure (e.g. [10]).
APPENDIX
Lemma 1. Let {xt}t≥0 satisfy xt → x as t → ∞. Let {ρt}t≥0 satisfy 0 < ρt ≤ 1 and
∑
t≥0 ρt = ∞. Then, the
sequence {yt}t≥0 given by yt = (1− ρt)yt−1 + ρtxt, t ≥ 1, satisfies yt → x as t→∞.
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Proof: The result follows from Toeplitz’s lemma [36].
Lemma 2. Let {ρt}t≥1 satisfy 0 < ρt ≤ 1,
∑
t≥1 ρt =∞ and
∑
t≥1 ρ
2
t <∞. Let {Ft}t≥1 be a filtration and let
{Xt}t≥1 be a sequence of bounded random variables, adapted to the filtration, say, |Xt| ≤ B. Let µt = E(Xt | Ft−1)
and assume that
(
1
ρt
− 1
)
(µt − µt−1)→ 0 almost surely. Then, the sequence of random variables {µ̂t}t≥0 given
by µ̂t = (1 − ρt)µ̂t−1 + ρtXt, t ≥ 1, satisfies |µ̂t − µt| → 0 almost surely.
Proof: Subtracting µt from both sides of µ̂t = (1−ρt)µ̂t−1+ρtXt gives Et = (1−ρt)Et−1+ρt
(
Xt − µt +
(
1
ρt
− 1
)
δt
)
,
where Et := µ̂t − µt and δt := µt−1 − µt, δ0 := 0.
Introduce the Ft-adapted sequences, for t ≥ 1
Ft = (1− ρt)Ft−1 + ρt(Xt − µt), F1 = E1
Gt = (1− ρt)Gt−1 + ρt
(
1
ρt
− 1
)
δt, G1 = 0,
and note that Et = Ft +Gt. We will now show that Ft → 0 and Gt → 0 almost surely.
By assumption,
(
1
ρt
− 1
)
δt → 0 almost surely. Lemma 1 applied to {Gt}t≥1 gives Gt → 0 almost surely.
On the other hand,
E(F 2t | Ft−1) = (1 − ρt)2F 2t−1 + ρ2tE
(
(Xt − µt)2 | Ft−1
)
≤ (1 − ρt)2F 2t−1 + ρ2t 4B2
=
(
1 + ρ2t
)
F 2t−1 − 2ρtF 2t−1 + ρ2t4B2.
Since
∑
t≥0 ρ
2
t < ∞, from the Robbins-Monro Lemma [37] we conclude that, almost surely, {F 2t }t≥1 converges
and
∑
t≥0 ρtF
2
t−1 <∞: these two properties imply Ft → 0 almost surely.
Lemma 3. Let {ρt}t≥1 be such that 0 < ρt ≤ 1 and limt→∞ 1tρt = 0. Then
∑
t≥1 ρt = ∞.
Proof: We claim there exists c, T > 0 such that ρt ≥ c 1t for all t ≥ T . If this were not so, then for every
c > 0 there would hold ρt < c 1t infinitely often, which would imply
1
tρt
> 1
c
infinitely often—contradicting the
hypothesis that limt→∞ 1tρt = 0.
Thus, there exists c, T > 0 such that ρt ≥ c 1t ∀t ≥ T , and hence
∑
t≥1 ρt ≥
∑
t≥T ρt ≥ c
∑
t≥T
1
t
= ∞.
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